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The Need for a Ban on All Radioactive
Waste Disposal in the Ocean
I. INTRODUCTION
Man is both creature and moulder of his environment, which gives him physi-
cal sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social
and spiritual growth. In the long and tortuous evolution of the human race
on this planet a stage has been reached when, through the rapid acceleration
of science and technology, man has acquired the power to transform his en vi-
ronment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both aspects of
man's environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well
being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights - even the right to life
itself 1
The harnessing of nuclear power is the technological advance which
best represents the ability of the human race to transform the environ-
ment for both good and bad. Nuclear power can be used either to de-
stroy the earth or to improve greatly the quality of life for all persons.
Attendant with this power is the problem of what to do with radioactive
wastes' left behind by the private and public uses of a technology not yet
I Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-16,
1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1, at 3 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Conference].
2 International law currently distinguishes between high-level and low-level radioactive wastes.
High-level radioactive wastes, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency, generally have
longer half-lives and consist mainly of spent fuel from nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. Low-
level radioactive wastes include a host of substances used in connection with the nuclear fuel process
(for instance protective clothing or the water used to cool nuclear reactors) which are found in lesser
concentrations than the spent fuel. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Information Circular,
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, the
Definition Required by Annex I, 6 to the Convention, and the Recommendations Required by
Annex II, § D, INFCIRC/205/Add.l/Rev.1 (1978), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 826
(1979) [hereinafter IAEA Definitions and Recommendations]. There is much confusion and debate
over precise distinctions between high- and low-level wastes, which is one reason this Comment
argues for more restraint in dumping radioactive wastes of any kind at sea. There is even confusion
over classifying wastes as falling into only the high- or low-level categories. For instance, the Nu-
clear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said that
there is no agreed-upon definition of level of wastes, either high, low or medium, because of the
infancy of knowledge of radioactive wastes. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, OBJECTIVES, CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ARISING FROM NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMMES 25
(1977) [hereinafter NEA OBJECTIVES].
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fifty years old.'
As wastes from nuclear power plants,4 government projects,5 and
various fields of science6 continue to amass, attention is being focused
increasingly on the earth's oceans as a potentially viable sink for these
wastes.7 While other alternatives, such as burial in deep geological salt
formations, 8 are currently being developed, the full ramifications of these
plans remain unknown.9 The problems presented by radioactive waste
disposal are compounded because much of the radioactive waste cur-
rently created will remain a hazard, not just for a few generations, but for
centuries."0 Thus, whatever options industry and the international com-
munity pursue, such alternatives must be safe for the human population
and the environment.
Once a thorough comparative study has been completed, the ocean
may someday prove to be an attractive site for radioactive wastes. I Cur-
rently, however, too many questions persist as to this particular disposal
option. Not enough is known about the possible effects on ocean ecosys-
tems and our relationship to them to conclude that the ocean is a viable
3 See A. CALDER, LIVING WITH THE ATOM (1962).
4 One estimate put the volume of low-level waste from nuclear power plants in the United
States alone at 275 million cubic feet by the year 2000. Ocean Dumping and Pollution: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.
196 (1977 & 1978) (statement of John Deutch, Office of Energy Research).
5 Weapons testing and state-owned nuclear power plants are the main sources of government-
produced radioactive wastes.
6 See IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2, at 838.
7 See, e.g., NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT: THE OCEAN ALTERNATIVE (T. Jackson ed.
1981); COMMISSION ON NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DISPOSAL
IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: AN OCEANOGRAPHIC ASSESSMENT, AN ANALYTICAL STUDY
FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1976) [hereinafter EPA ASSESSMENT].
8 The United States Environmental Protection Agency is in the process of selecting primary
and secondary site locations for the burial of radioactve wastes, including high-level wastes from
nuclear generators. This is currently the favored method of both the United States and Canada. See
The Management of Canada's Nuclear Wastes, Report EP 77-6 for the Ministry of Energy, Mines
and Resources, Aug. 31, 1977 [hereinafter Canadian Waste].
9 Id.
10 See Finn, Ocean Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: The Obligation of International Cooperation
to Protect the Marine Environment, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 622, 635 (1981). See also NEA OBJECTIVES,
supra note 2, at 28. The chart there lists the half-lives of 45 radioactive substances, how they are
generated and their major modes of decay (alpha rays or beta-gamma rays). The half-life is
equivalent to how long the substance is radioactive, though the danger from a radioactive substance
is not constant over the period of the half-life. In other words, the danger posed by a radioactive
substance such as Plutonium-238, which has a half-life of 87 years, is much greater in the first few
years than the last years of the half-life because of the rate of alpha ray emission. The half-lives of
the man-made substances listed in the NEA Objectives chart range from less than two hours (Argon-
41) to 17,000,000 years (Iodine-129). Id.
1 I EPA ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at vii.
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disposal site for radioactive wastes. 2 While proponents of this disposal
technique argue that the sea has large amounts of naturally occurring
radioactivity, 13 this defense ignores the central question of what effect
additional man-made radioactive materials will have on the ocean
environment. 14
A tremendous amount of knowledge concerning ocean systems has
been obtained in the past decade. Nonetheless, there remains a paucity
of conflicting data as to the effects of ocean dumping, not only as to low-
level radioactive wastes, but also as to the high-level wastes produced by
nuclear power plants.15 Debate still rages over how best to classify vari-
ous forms of radioactive waste for disposal at sea or elsewhere, as differ-
ent international organizations use different categories.' 6 Studies
comparing the feasability of reuse or recovery, or disposal on land, in the
air, or in the ocean remain incomplete.17 Indeed, this lack of data led the
London Dumping Convention ("LDC") to issue a two-year moratorium
on all radioactive waste disposal at sea.' 8 This ban expired at the end of
1985, but the need for continued study prompted the LDC to extend the
ban pending the completion of further research."
Despite the extension of the ban, pressure will likely build to permit
at least the resumption of low-level radioactive waste disposal at sea.20 A
representative of the United States nuclear industry has stated that such
a practice is politically impossible for industry in the United States,2 '
nonetheless, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") is considering ocean disposal. Other nations, such as Great
Britain and Japan, are also likely to support waste disposal at sea for
their nuclear industries. 2
12 See, eg., Canadian Waste, supra note 8, at 38.
13 See IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2, at 839.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 841. See also Finn, supra note 10, at 630-35.
16 See, eg., Third Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 6, I.M.C.O. Doc. LDC 111/12,
Oct. 24, 1978 (Dumping of Radioactive Substances); NEA OBJECTIVES, supra note 2, at 25.
17 Many writers and statesmen call for such research, but present efforts, such as the comparison
of alternatives undertaken by Canada, are only preliminary steps. See, e.g., Canadian Waste, supra
note 8.
18 Resolution LDC 14(7), Disposal of Radio-Active Wastes and other Radio-Active Matter at
Sea, IMO Doc. LDC VII/6 (Feb. 17, 1983).
19 Resolution LDC 21(9), Dumping of Radioactive Wastes at Sea, IMO Doc. LDC IX/12 (Oct.
18, 1985).
20 See U.S. Ocean Dumping of Low-level A-waste not Likely, Despite Report, The Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, July 25, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
21 Id.
22 Id. Great Britain was one of only six nations to vote against the dumping ban in 1985 and
Japan was one of only seven nations to abstain. Ninth Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties
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The human race is fast approaching a crossroad at which it must
decide how the oceans and their resources will be used. Increasingly, the
sea is looked to as a future resource base which cannot be wasted. In
formulating policy to exploit the sea's resources in the best way, the sea
should be treated as an integrated system;23 what happens in one part of
the sea necessarily affects other parts of the sea.24 Thus, there is a need
to reexamine existing international law on radioactive waste disposal at
sea to ensure that all of the sea is protected adequately.
This Comment will examine exisiting international law concerning
ocean dumping of radioactive waste, including the first and third United
Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea Treaties ("UNCLOS I" and
"UNCLOS III"), the LDC, and various United Nations resolutions.
25
As part of the analysis, particular attention will be paid to seabed im-
plantation of radioactive wastes, as there seems to be confusion as to
whether seabed disposal constitutes ocean dumping.26 Despite the prom-
ise of international law to protect and preserve the maritime environment
for future generations, analysis of international law will show that it has
been ineffective in achieving these objectives.27 This failure has led many
commentators to propose solutions which are, at best, only partially sat-
isfactory, not reflecting the true intent of international law.28 In con-
trast, this Comment will propose a foundation for protecting humans and
the marine environment from long- and short-term hazards of radioac-
tive wastes29 based on a planetary trust.30 The theory advocates that,
until safer methods are developed, all radioactive waste disposal at sea be
halted.3
to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter
4.91, IMO Doc. LDC IX/12, Oct. 18, 1985 [hereinafter Ninth LDC Meeting]. See also Plan for
Sea Dumping of,4tomic Waste, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 25, 1983, at 4, col. 1; and En-
ergy Poor Japan Looks to the Atom but Where to Dispose of the Waste, United Press International,
May 9, 1984 [hereinafter Japanese Waste].
23 See Schwebel, Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-
courses 140, [1980] 2, pt. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 159, 180, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/332. See gener-
ally IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2, at 841 (radioactivity from all sources
must be included in any assessment of release rate limit).
24 Id.
25 See infra notes 32-123 and accompanying text.
26 See Curtis, Legality of Seabed Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes Under the London
Dumping Convention, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 383 (1985). See also Ninth LDC Meeting 1 5,
supra note 22.
27 See infra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 153-98 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 199-229 and accompanying text.
30 Brown-Weiss, The Planetary Trust. Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, I I ECOLOGY
L.Q. 495 (1984).
31 See infra notes 213-29 and accompanying text.
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II. INTERNATIONAL LAW, RADIOACTIVE WASTE,
AND THE OCEANS
As the human race has become more interested in ocean use, the
international legal community has become more active in setting guide-
lines for the present use and future preservation of ocean resources.32
The guidelines far exceed the narrow regulations of international ship-
ping on the high seas, which are the oldest international laws involving
the sea. While seabed mining, fishing rights, and boundary disputes are
current areas of concern, pollution of the sea has received the most con-
stant attention.3 3 In particular, radioactive wastes as a source of such
pollution has received greater scrutiny than any form of marine pollution
with the exception of oil pollution.3"
There are three important global treaties concerning ocean pollution
by radioactive wastes. 35 These agreements and other international decla-
rations, regulations, and United Nations resolutions form the framework
in which the international community handles the problem of radioactive
waste disposal at sea. Most, if not all, of these agreements share common
themes prevalent in other fields of international law. Those themes in-
clude preservation of the marine environment, the equitable use of
marine resources, the need for international cooperation, and a recogni-
tion of the continuing responsibility to pass on to future generations a
livable world.
A. The Early Efforts
UNCLOS 136 was the first major treaty to address ocean disposal of
radioactive waste. The adoption of the treaty occurred before nuclear
power became a viable energy source and well before industrial radioac-
tive waste disposal became a major pollution issue. Although they were
32 This is evident not only in the abundance of law concerning sea disposal of radioactve wastes,
but also in the number of laws regulating seabed mining and other uses of the sea. See The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1261 (regulating seabed mining) [hereinaf-
ter UNCLOS III].
33 For example, oil pollution has received significant attention. See Dempsey, Compliance and
Enforcement in International Law-Oil Pollution of the Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 459 (1985).
34 Finn, supra note 10, at 623. See also Boehme, The Use of the Seabed as a Dumping Site, in
THE LAW OF THE SEA TOWARDS AN OCEAN SPACE REGIME 93, 117 (1972).
35 The three treaties are: the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, April 29,
1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter UNCLOS I]; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 [herein-
after LDC]; and UNCLOS III, supra note 31.
36 UNCLOS I, supra note 35.
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unable to agree on the primary issue before them - nuclear weapons
testing3 7 - the conferees did recognize "the need for cooperative inter-
national action to control disposal of radioactive wastes in the sea."
38
The Geneva Convention on the High Seas,39 adopted as part of UN-
CLOS I, laid the groundwork for international cooperation in controlling
radioactive waste pollution of the ocean. This convention states in part:
1. Every state shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from
the dumping of radio-active waste, taking into account any standards and
regulations which may be formulated by the competent international
organization.
2. All states shall co-operate with the competent international organiza-
tions in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas or air
space above, resulting from any activities with radio-active materials or
other harmful agents.4 °
UNCLOS I called upon the International Atomic Energy Agency
("IAEA") and other organizations to "pursue whatever studies and take
whatever action" necessary to control the problem of radioactive waste
disposal at sea. Furthermore, the treaty encouraged these organizations
to propose regulations for the prevention of ocean pollution resulting
from wastes which "adversely affect man and his marine resources."41
Commentators disagree on how to interpret this language.4 2 Some
suggest that UNCLOS I merely urges international cooperation and
deems radioactive waste disposal at sea a reasonable use of man's ocean
resources given proper circumstances.4 3 Others argue that the treaty
should be read as promoting the development of international scientific
and substantive norms for regulating dumping." Regardless of the inter-
pretation, the failure of UNCLOS I to ban explicitly radioactive waste
disposal in the oceans has not meant that it is reasonable to dump all
radioactive wastes in the seas. The IAEA did not recommend disposing
high-level radioactive wastes; it did say that low-level wastes might be
dumped, but only under tightly controlled circumstances.4 5 The IAEA
also emphasized that its recommendations were provisional pending the
results of important research on the effects of radioactive wastes on ocean
37 See Finn, supra note 10, at 646.
38 Id. (quoting M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 864-65
(1962)).
39 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
40 Id.
41 UNCLOS I, supra note 35, at 58.
42 See Finn, supra note 10, at 646-47.
43 See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 38, at 867.
44 See Finn, supra note 10, at 647.
45 Id. at 647-48.
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environments.46 Despite the varying interpretations of the treaty's efforts
to control radioactive waste disposal at sea, the language of UNCLOS I
stresses three of the four basic directives of international law concerning
radioactive waste disposal at sea: environmental preservation, interna-
tional cooperation, and international equity.47
UNCLOS I stood alone in the field of international agreements on
ocean dumping until the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, a
flurry of activity, including several United Nations resolutions, 48 led to
the LDC 49 It was this convention which established a specific frame-
work for international control of waste disposal in the oceans, a provision
not included in UNCLOS I. The LDC remains "the only global agree-
ment concerned solely with the disposal of wastes in the marine environ-
ment by dumping."50 Fifty-five nations have ratified the LDC51 since it
came into force in 1975.52
When the LDC was drafted in 1972, United Nations resolutions and
declarations concerning uses of the sea and seabed reinforced the LDC's
basic provisions of international law. One of the earliest statements on
the subject, United Nations Resolution 2467,11 echoes the principles of
equity, cooperation, and responsibility to future generations. The resolu-
tion urges "international co-operation" in promoting peaceful uses of the
sea and seabed "taking into account the foreseeable development of tech-
nology and the economic implications of such exploitations and bearing
in mind the fact that such exploitation should benefit mankind as a
whole."5 4 Further, the resolution urges that "measures of co-operation
... be adopted by the international community in order to prevent the
marine pollution which may result from the exploration and exploitation
of the resources of this area." 55
46 Id.
47 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48 Among them are Resolution on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A.
Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 50 (1974); Resolution on the Protection of the Marine
Environment, G.A. Res. 3133, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3133, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
234 (1973); Resolution on the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28), at 24 (1970); and U.N. General Assembly Resolutions on Reservation of
Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor for Peaceful Purposes, G.A. Res. 2467, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2467 (1968),
reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 201.
49 LDC, supra note 35.
50 See Curtis, supra note 26, at 392.
51 Id. at 393.
52 Id.
53 G.A. Res. 2467, supra note 48.
54 Id. at 202.
55 Id.
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Subsequent resolutions parallel these sentiments. United Nations
Resolution 2749,56 explicitly referred to in the preamble of the LDC as
the declaration of principles governing the seabed and its subsoil,57 states
that the sea, its subsoil, and resources "are the common heritage of man-
kind."' 58 It further instructs nations to take measures for "the prevention
of pollution ... to the marine environment, including the coastline, and
of the interference with the ecological balance of the marine environ-
ment." 59 The resolution calls for international cooperation to achieve
this aim and for the "equitable sharing" of the benefits derived from the
sea.
6 0
The most articulate expression of the concepts contained within
these declarations came in June 1972 (immediately before the opening of
the LDC) at the United Nations Conference on the Environment held in
Stockholm. 61 There the conferees articulated an "imperative goal for
mankind:"6 2 that present and future generations owe a duty to defend
and improve the human environment. 3 In total, the conferees adopted
twenty-six principles.
The Stockholm Conference declarations contain equally strong pro-
visions concerning attempts to combat pollution, international coopera-
tion, and international equity. Principle Seven calls upon nations to
"take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that
are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources
and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate
uses of the sea."'  Principle Thirteen instructs nations to "adopt an inte-
grated and co-ordinated approach to their development., 65 The confer-
ees concluded that, in order to achieve the goals established at the
convention, "[i]nternational matters concerning the protection and im-
provement of the environment" would be handled best in a "co-operative
spirit by all countries, big and small, on an equal footing."
66
These international resolutions form the background to the LDC
and UNCLOS III. These two treaties attempt to create a framework for
managing radioactive waste disposal at sea. At the same time, they re-
56 G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 48.
57 LDC, supra note 35, at 2406.
58 G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 48, at 24.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Stockholm Conference, supra note 1.
62 Id. at 3.
63 Id. at 4.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. Principle 24, at 5.
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tain the same spirit and intent expressed in earlier resolutions and
declarations.
B. The London Dumping Convention
Plans for the LDC had been made before the Stockholm Confer-
ence. It is clear from the text of the treaty, however, that the conference
influenced the LDC. For example, Article I of the LDC provides:
Contracting parties shall individually and collectively promote the effective
control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and pledge
themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of
the sea by the dumping of waste and other matter that is liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to dam-
age amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.67
Other sections of the agreement repeatedly stress the need to protect
human health and interests in the sea as well as the total marine environ-
ment. The preamble in particular notes the "vital importance to human-
ity" of the total marine environment. It recognizes that the sea is not an
unlimited resource and cannot be an open disposal site for every waste.
The agreement provides that, while nations have a right to exploit the
ocean resources within their jurisdiction, they also have "responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to their nvironment, to the environment of other States, or to
areas beyond thel limits of national jurisdiction.
68
The LDC banned outright the dumping of high-level radioactive
wastes.69 It was left to the IAEA to define what radioactive wastes were
"high-level." 70 The convention allows dumping of low-level radioactive
wastes, but only after careful analysis and impact studies are completed
and special permits are issued by the IAEA and recorded under the con-
vention.71 The convention also allows individual nations to ban the
67 LDC, supra note 35, at 2406.
68 Id.
69 Article IV of the LDC prohibits the dumping of any materials listed in Annex I. Id. at 2408.
The materials listed in Annex I include "high-level radio-active wastes . . . defined . . . by the
competent international body in this field, at the present the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as unsuitable for dumping at sea." Id. at 2465.
70 Id. For the technical definition of high-level radioactve wastes, see IAEA Definitions and
Recommendations, supra note 2, at 828-29. The IAEA also stressed that "[t]he Definition must not
be taken to imply that material falling outside the Definition is thereby deemed to be suitable for
dumping." Id. at 823, A.1.2.
7! Article IV states that the dumping of materials listed in Annex II require prior special permits
based on factors listed in Annex III. Id. at 2408. Annex II includes "radio-active wastes... not
included in Annex I." Id. at 2466. For a description of the factors to be considered before issuing a
permit, see Annex III and the IAEA Definitions and Recommendations. Id. at 2467-68. See also
IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2, at 829-31. Note that even here the IAEA
urges caution and restraint: "[t]he doses to individual members of the public should not reach the
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dumping of low-level radioactive wastes.72 It also calls upon contracting
states to implement "measures to prevent and punish conduct in contra-
vention of the provisions of this Convention. ' 73 To the extent any state
may be responsible for damage to the marine environment as a result of
dumping, Article X states that the contracting parties should develop
procedures in international law for assessing liability and settling dis-
putes regarding dumping.74 The convention also urges the formation of
regional agreements on marine dumping.75 Consequently, while dump-
ing high-level radioactive wastes in the ocean is illegal under interna-
tional law for the fifty-five contracting parties of the LDC,76 the legality
of low-level radioactive waste dumping and seabed disposal of all levels
of radioactive waste remains at issue.7 7 (The propriety of such activities
is a separate question and will be addressed later in this Comment.7 8)
The organization which promulgates standards for the LDC, the
IAEA,7 9 issued recommendations in 1978 for "a detailed environmental
and ecological assessment" of each application for a permit to dump An-
nex II radioactive wastes.8" Justifications favoring sea disposal over land
disposal are to be included in such assessments.81 Other issues to be con-
sidered by the IAEA include: the likely exposure doses to humans and
appropriate dose limits, now or in the future.... No special permit should be issued which would
cause these limits to be approached." Id. at 829-30, 11 B..2.(3). Subsequent amendments to the
Annexes have not materially altered how permits should be considered with respect to radioactive
wastes. See Tenth Consultative Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, Annexes 2-5, IMO Doc. LDC X/
15, Nov. 5, 1986 [hereinafter Tenth LDC Meeting].
72 See LDC art. IV, supra note 71, at 2408, which states that: "No provision of this Convention
is to be interpreted to prevent a Contracting Party from prohibiting, insofar as that Party is con-
cerned, the dumping of wastes or other matter not mentioned in Annex L" Id. This reinforces the
notion that nations should be very reluctant to allow sea dumping of materials as potentially hazard-
ous as even low-level radioactive waste.
73 Id. art. VII(2), at 2410.
74 Id. art. X, at 2411. Outside of arbitration provisions present in such treaties as UNCLOS III,
there is nothing in international law to punish transgressors. The success of agreements is up to the
good graces of the participants.
75 Id. art. VIII, at 2410.
76 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
77 See generally Curtis, supra note 26.
78 See infra notes 199-229 and accompanying text.
79 For a more complete and detailed examination, see LDC, supra note 35, arts. 111(7), IV, &
XIV(2) and annexes I, II, & III, at 2407-08, 2412, 2465-68.
80 IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2, at 829, B.I.1. The IAEA issued
updated recommendations to the LDC at the Tenth LDC Meeting. Publication deadlines prevented
time to obtain updated material, though the report of the Tenth LDC Meeting indicates little change
in the IAEA standards except to toughen limits for radioactive substances. Tenth LDC Meeting,
supra note 71, j 5.13-5.16.
81 IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2, at 830, q B.1.4.
Radioactive Waste
7:803(1986)
risks to sea ecosystems;82 the degree by which pretreatment, contain-
ment, and site selection can reduce exposure levels;8 3 the availability of
sites away from heavily fished areas, underwater cables, areas of difficult
navigation, and areas of biologically productive or potentially productive
resources;84 and the ability to monitor the site after dumping.8  The
IAEA also recommends that all sites for this type of radioactive waste
disposal be located below fifty degrees latitude, deeper than 4,000 meters,
away from continental margins and islands, and smaller than 10,000
square kilometers.8 6 Also, the number of sites should be strictly lim-
ited. 7 A mere cursory reading of the 1978 recommendations gives rise
to the inference that the IAEA was extremely reluctant to allow special
permits for the disposal of even low-level radioactive wastes at sea under
the LDC. The recommendations suggest that extreme caution be taken
given the uncertainties surrounding such disposal actions.
Other problems have arisen in the wake of the LDC. One of the
most troubling is the suggestion that, instead of "dumping" radioactive
wastes at sea, they be "implanted" in the seabed. 8 Seabed implantation
is problematic because it is possible to argue that the LDC neither bars
nor regulates such activity.89 One commentator has argued recently that
the LDC does prohibit such activity.90 Barring this argument, however,
seabed implantation of radioactive wastes may not be covered fully by
international law. Until this gap is closed, the international controls and
discussion provided by the annual LDC meetings will be lost.
The question whether the LDC covers seabed disposal was raised
seriously for the first time at the Seventh Consultative Meeting of the
Contracting Parties in 1983.91 At that meeting, several nations expressed
either doubts or concerns as to the coverage of the LDC.9 2 The primary
reason for this concern was that seabed disposal was not considered an
82 Id. at 832, B.1.4.(4) & (5).
83 Id. q B. 1.4.(6).
84 Id. C.2..
85 Id. at 831, B.2.
86 Id. at 832, C.2.
87 Id. C.2.1.(6).
88 See Curtis, supra note 26.
89 This is true because of the LDC definition of the term "dumping" in art. III(l)(a) and its
confusing use of the term "at sea" in that definition. See LDC, supra note 35, at 2407.
90 Curtis, supra note 26.
91 Id. at 384-86. The Norwegian delegation noted that the work of the Seabed Working Group
may lead to seabed implantation of radioactive wastes carried out on a national basis. It queried
whether such activity was covered under the LDC. The Finnish, Spanish, and West German delega-
tions echoed that concern and drafted a resolution (Resolution LDC.15/7) calling for special inter-
sessional study of the matter. Id.
92 Id.
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option for radioactive waste disposal at the time of the original draft-
ing. 93 The concern also reflected international recognition of the danger
radioactive wastes pose as a marine pollutant because they are "long-
lived" and "accumulate in certain parts of the ecosystem, including liv-
ing organisms." 94 The ecological and biological effects of such accumu-
lations represent hazards to human health.95
The concerns expressed were significant enough that the LDC is-
sued a two-year moratorium on ocean disposal of all radioactive wastes
pending the results of scientific studies to be presented at the LDC's
Ninth Consultative Meeting. 96 The parties did not discuss, however, the
legality of seabed implantation despite the obvious concern for the
marine environment. 97 The LDC discussed the matter briefly at its
Ninth and Tenth meetings, but little progress was made toward settling
the issue.98 All parties agreed that the LDC was the proper forum for
discussing seabed implantation, but they left unresolved the key question
of whether to permit high-level radioactive waste disposal in the seabed
for experimentation.99
Any discussion of the legality of seabed disposal must be made with
reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1"' as it
presents the most widely accepted and customary means of interpreting
international law. Article 31 of the convention states that a treaty or an
agreement should be interpreted in accordance with the expressions of
the parties' intent.1 °1 Furthermore, a treaty should be interpreted in
good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their
context, and in light of the treaty's object and purpose. 102 It follows then
that the LDC should be read in light of its basic purpose as stated in the
preamble: to protect the marine environment. 103
93 Id. at 393.
94 Id. at 389.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 389-90.
97 Id. at 393.
98 See Ninth LDC Meeting, supra note 22, 1 5, and Tenth LDC Meeting, supra note 71, 5.1-
5.7.
99 Tenth LDC Meeting, supra note 71, 5.2-5.3.
100 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1969. As of April 1983, 21 nations had
ratified or acceded to both the LDC and the Vienna Convention. The United States and five other
nations have signed the LDC but have not approved the Vienna Convention. See Curtis, supra note
50, at 411 n.17.
101 Curtis, supra note 26, at 391. Clarifying whether seabed implantation is included within the
term "dumping" is the aim of the Resolution LDC.15/7. Id. at 385-86.
102 Id. at 392.
103 Id. at 393. Thus, "an interpretation which makes the treaty effective, rather than ineffective,
should be preferred as long as it does not frustrate the object and purpose of the treaty." Id. at 392.
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One of the paragraphs contained in the LDC's preamble sheds light
on the status of seabed disposal. The paragraph reflects Resolution 2749
of the United Nations General Assembly on the Principles Governing
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction.1 "4 As discussed earlier, Resolution
2749105 calls upon nations to take measures to prevent "pollution and
contamination, and other hazards to the marine environment, including
the coastline, and of interference with the ecological balance of the
marine environment" and to protect and conserve the ocean's natural
resources and the flora and fauna of the marine environment.
1 0 6
The first two articles of the LDC call on the contracting parties to
control "all sources of pollution of the marine environment,... to take
all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea" °10 7 by dumping,
and to harmonize efforts and policies. 108 Article III(l)(a) defines "dump-
ing" as "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from
vessels, aircraft, platforms, or other manmade structures at sea." 10 9 Ar-
ticle XII speaks more broadly of the contracting parties protecting the
marine environment against pollution from the most dangerous sources,
such as radioactive pollutants from all sources, including vessels.110 As
one commentator has stated, "[t]he express listing of radioactive sub-
stances in this broader context reinforces the extreme caution and re-
straint that is reflected by the Contracting Parties decision to prohibit the
dumping of high level wastes." 1 Consequently, the provisions of the
LDC and other pertinent international agreements seem to indicate that,
for purposes of disposing radioactive wastes at sea, no distinction should
be made between marine waters and the seabed and subsoil.
Including seabed implantation of wastes within the ambit of ocean dumping is certainly consistent
with the object and purpose of the LDC while, at the same time, making the treaty effective rather
than ineffective.
104 LDC, supra note 35, at 2406.
105 G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 48, at 24.
106 Id.
107 LDC, supra note 35, at 2406.
108 Id. at 2407.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 2411.
11 Curtis, supra note 26, at 398. The factors for issuing permits listed in Annex III support this
reading. The provisions to be considered include "[a]ccumulation and biotransformation in biologi-
cal materials or sediments; ... location in relation to other areas; ... [b]ottom characteristics (eg.
"topography, geochemical and geological characteristics and biological productivity;") and
"[p]ossible effects on other uses of the sea (eg. .... interference with fishing or navigation through
deposit of waste or solid objects on the sea floor....)" LDC, supra note 35, at 2467-68 (emphasis
added).
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C. The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea
UNCLOS II1112 opened for signature in 1983 and has been signed
by 159 nations.1 13 The treaty will not come into force, however, until
one year after sixty nations ratify it. 114 UNCLOS III furthers the aim of
the LDC to prevent marine pollution and removes doubt as to whether
waste disposal in the seabed is prohibited by international law. Part XII
is devoted exclusively to detailing the duties of participating nations "to
protect and preserve the marine environment."1 1 5
In general, UNCLOS III seeks to prevent and reduce pollution of
the marine environment from any source.116 UNCLOS III very broadly
defines pollution as:
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment, including estuaries, which result in such deleteri-
ous effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human
health, hindrence to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities. 117
The treaty emphasizes the need to prevent and minimize "the release of
toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persis-
tent, from land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere or by
dumping."1 18 It further clarifies the LDC definition of dumping to read
"any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft,
platforms, or other man-made structures at sea."' '119 This wording leaves
little doubt that UNCLOS III applies to seabed disposal and not just the
traditional methods of waste disposal at sea.12
0
UNCLOS III also reinforces the themes presented in the other inter-
national resolutions, declarations, and treaties discussed above. Interna-
tional equity, protection of the environment, responsibility to future
112 UNCLOS III, supra note 32.
113 See Recent Action Regarding Treaties to Which the United States Is Not a Party, 24 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 268 (1985). It should be noted that all the major nations which have industries
producing radioactive waste signed UNCLOS III. Whether this will lead to ratification is another
question, as the Reagan Administration has so far successfully fought efforts to gain Senate Ratifica-
tion in the United States.
114 See Curtis, supra note 26, at 400.
115 See UNCLOS III, supra note 32, at 1308-16, part XII.
116 Id. at 1308, art. 194.
117 Id. at 1271.
118 Id. at 1308.
119 Id. at 1271.
120 Curtis, supra note 26, at 401-03. Curtis concludes that there should not be any conflict be-




generations, and international cooperation are repeatedly stressed in the
document, particularly in Part XII.121 Thus, UNCLOS III both repeats
and strengthens the ideas asserted in the past thirty years to control in-
ternationally radioactive waste disposal at sea. When this latest treaty
enters into force, the international community should pursue aggres-
sively the goals expressed in these documents.
Based upon the LDC and UNCLOS I and III, it is clear that the
international community is seeking to prevent, to the greatest extent pos-
sible, damage to human life and the marine environment from radioac-
tive waste disposal in the sea. International law already bans sea disposal
of high-level radioactive wastes, which constitute the bulk of all radioac-
tive wastes. 122 It appears that the international community is now be-
coming increasingly skeptical of low-level radioactive wastes as well.
The restrictive IAEA 1978 and 1986 recommendations and the strong
language used in the LDC and UNCLOS III also evidence this trend.'23
Whether this message is being perceived by industry and national gov-
ernments producing radioactive wastes is the question to which this
Comment now turns.
III. CONTROLLING RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL AT SEA
Since 1946, when the United States began dumping radioactive
wastes off the northeastern Atlantic coastline of New England and in the
Gulf of Mexico, at least one nuclear nation has been disposing of its radi-
oactive wastes at sea.124 In more recent years, those wastes have in-
cluded various amounts of radioactive wastes from industrial sources.'
25
121 UNCLOS III, supra note 32, at 1308-16. The environmental protection theme is present
throughout this part of UNCLOS. Article 192 provides: "States have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment." Article 194 states that nations shall take all measures "necessary
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source" and that
measures taken under the treaty "shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine environment."
Id. at 1308. The themes of equity and international cooperation are present in Article 194, which
provides that in the endeavor to reduce marine pollution, nations "shall endeavor to harmonize their
policies in this connection." Article 194 further states that nations should not "cause damage by
pollution to other States and their environment." Article 197 declares that: "States shall co-operate
on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis.... in formulating and elaborating interna-
tional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention
.... " Id. The concern over future generations is expressed in the statements citing the need to
preserve the marine environment in articles 192, 193, 194, and 197 among others. Id.
122 See supra notes 49-76 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 67-121 and accompanying text.
124 See Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 96th Cong., Ist & 2nd Sess. 341 (1979 & 1980) [hereinafter Oceanography Hearings]
(statement of Roger Mattson). See also Wasserman, Disposal of Radoactive Waste, 19 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 425.
125 Wasserman, supra note 124, at 427.
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The United States ceased disposing of such wastes in 1970,126 prior to the
LDC. Several nations, 127 however, including Great Britain and Belgium,
have continued to dump radioactive waste into the sea following the
LDC. Other nations, notably Japan, were on the verge of initiating ma-
jor dumping operations, but halted plans because of pressure from their
neighbors. 
128
Traditional methods of radioactive waste disposal at sea are not the
only questions of international law being studied. Research into the via-
bility of seabed implantation of high-level radioactive wastes is being
conducted under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development's ("OECD") Nuclear Energy Agency
("NEA").129 The NEA formed the Seabed Working Group to coordi-
nate these research efforts.1 3 ° The NEA has delegates from the major
nuclear power producing nations, including the United States, Great
Britain, France, and Japan.
If the research conducted by the Seabed Working Group results in
radioactive wastes being implanted in the sea subsoil, then the LDC will
probably be violated3 and UNCLOS III will most certainly be vio-
lated.132 Whether these violations would be significant enough to deter
waste implantation is questionable, given that neither treaty provides ex-
plicit procedures for punishing violators other than the general treaty
enforcement powers assigned to each nation.'33 It is unlikely that any
nation which either dumps radioactive wastes at sea or allows an indus-
try within its jurisdiction to do the same would prosecute the dumping
party for violating international law. Additional problems, such as proof
of damage to specific victims, would also be difficult to solve. 134 Consid-
eration of this question would be reached only if the plaintiff could estab-
lish standing. Finally, impartial international courts do not exist to try
126 See Oceanography Hearings, supra note 124.
127 Wasserman, supra note 124, at 427.
128 See Japanese Waste, supra note 22.
129 See Wasserman, supra note 124, at 425.
130 Id. at 425-26.
131 See Curtis, supra note 26, at 395-98.
132 Id. at 400-03.
133 See LDC, supra note 35, art. X, at 2411.
134 UNCLOS III leaves regulation and enforcement to nations with coastline territory, urging
them to harmonize their policies. This leaves questions of proof of damage up to national, rather
than international, standards. Thus, UNCLOS III adds to the already difficult problem of establish-
ing the origins of dumped radioactive waste and the responsibility for damage to the marine environ-
ment especially considering that the damage may not come to light for many years. See UNCLOS
III, supra note 32, part XII, §§ 5 & 6, at 1310-13.
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such a case, award damages, or order a cleanup. 35
The chance that a situation will arise which will test the scope of the
treaties is not remote. A ready parallel continues to unfold in Great Brit-
ain. There, the government permits the dumping of low-level radioactive
wastes into the northeastern Atlantic.136 This activity did not cease with
the adoption of the LDC and the British government did not conduct the
obligatory impact studies or grant the necessary permit required by the
LDC. The dumping did not stop even in 1982, when the European Par-,
liament adopted a resolution urging the cessation of radioactive waste
dumping in the northeastern Atlantic either through "action within the
Community framework, or through international agreements." 137 The
British government still refused to stop when the LDC adopted the two-
year moratorium on all radioactive waste disposal at sea.' 38 It remains to
be seen whether Great Britain will heed the latest extension of that
moratorium.
Five Nordic countries - Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and
Norway - officially protested the British refusal to comply with interna-
tional law and its plan to increase by 60% the amount of radioactive
wastes being dumped.' 39 The British National Union of Seamen also
protested the government's action."' 0 Evidence of an unusually high rate
of radioactivity-linked cancer in children living near one of the dumpsites
in the Irish Sea has been published.' 4 ' It is suspected that there is a
connection between the dumping and the high cancer rate. Neither the
protests nor the research deterred the British government which contin-
ued dumping in the summer of 1985.42
When dumping has been stopped it usually has not been as a result
of an international agreement. The United States suspended dumping in
1970, in part, in reaction to the Council on Environmental Quality report
on ocean dumping. 143 That report noted that radioactive waste dumping
at sea was not as economical as other forms of radioactive waste dispo-
135 While arbitration is possible, no competent international body can bring suit against a pol-
luter, enter a judgment, and enforce the penalty assessed. See id. § 6.
136 See Wasserman, supra note 124, at 427.
137 Id. The Council of European Municipalities adopted almost the identical resolution a year
later. Id.
138 Id. That letter was sent to "once again inform the United Kingdom authorities of the strong
concern in the Nordic countries with respect to the planned and increased dumping operations of the
United Kingdom... representing an increase in the amount of waste of 60 per cent." Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. The government itself initiated an investigation more than two years ago. Id.
142 Id.
143 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OCEAN DUMPING: A NATIONAL POLICY (1970).
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sal. 1  The Netherlands stopped the sea disposal of radioactive wastes
from its nuclear power plants and industrial, medical, and scientific
sources in response to public opinion. As one Dutch government official
stated, "[t]his ministry is convinced that ocean dumping is a safe disposal
for wastes. But it is clear that our society does not want ocean dump-
ing."' 45 Japan changed its plans to dispose of radioactive wastes in the
Pacific only after protests from island nations near the disposal sites. 146
Perhaps the major reason that international law generally, and the
LDC and UNCLOS III specifically, have not been effective is that they
lack enforcement provisions to punish violators. 47 There is little re-
course for contracting parties or the International Court of Justice to
stop a nation or its industry from violating the treaties. The only viable
options are direct appeals on a nation-to-nation or nation-to-industry ba-
sis. As in the case of Great Britain's industrial radioactive waste dispo-
sal, these appeals are not always successful.
One other major problem with regard to the goals of international
law concerning radioactive waste disposal at sea is the changing stan-
dards defining which materials may be dumped and determining how
those materials may be dumped.' 48 While the different standards pro-
vided by international agencies are not great, they do pose some
problems. For example, it is unclear which agency regulations members
of the OECD must follow, as many OECD members are also members of
the LDC.'4 9 Both the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA,
144 Id. at 7. The report also noted that the Atomic Energy Commission placed a moratorium on
new permits for ocean disposal of radioactive wastes as of 1960. As of 1970 only one commercial
organization, one university, and two government agencies had outstanding permits. Id. "The pol-
icy recommended would continue the practice of prohibiting high-level radioactive wastes in the
ocean. Dumping other radioactive materials would be prohibited, except in a very few cases for
which no practical alternative offers less risk to man and his environment." Id. at 27.
145 Dutch to Stop Dumping Nuclear Wastes at Sea, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1982, at A5, col. 1.
146 Japanese Waste, supra note 22.
147 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Again, this is a fundamental problem with inter-
national law as a whole. Short of each nation sacrificing some measure of sovereignty (which is
extremely unlikely), the most feasible change is one of attitude. Nations must be willing to accept
more of a commonality of interest in the preservation of a global environment. Certainly there will
be nations such as Great Britain which will not be willing to share this view. In those situations,
international pressure can isolate and contain the problem nation's transgressions. This is perhaps
the biggest problem the intergenerational trust faces, but it is neither fatal nor intractable.
148 Several international agencies have issued guidelines and recommendations on the various
rules for site selection, packaging, monitoring, and allowable exposure levels. See, eg., NEA OBJEC-
TIVES, supra note 2; IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2; and UNITED NATIONS
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION, IONIZING RADIATION:
SOURCES AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS, U.N. Sales No. 2.82.lx.8 (1982)[hereinafter UNSCEAR
REPORT].





which is the designated authority for regulatory purposes, have issued
guidelines. 150 The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation also issues periodic reports recommending maximum
radiation exposure levels and presents models which indicate how radio-
active waste disposal at sea may effect actual exposure levels. 1 ' Each
agency has updated its guidelines repeatedly, restricting more types of
radioactive waste and the way in which the wastes should be pack-
aged.15 The potential for conflict is apparent; the solution is equally
obvious. The definitional and regulatory function should fall under the
auspices of one international agency which should consider the advice of
the other agencies.
It may be argued that fears of low-level radioactive waste disposal at
sea are unwarranted as low-level wastes do not constitute as significant a
threat as high-level wastes. In its crudest form, the argument suggests
that, if the LDC and UNCLOS III do not ban low-level radioactive
waste disposal at sea, it must be safe. The next section of this Comment
examines this position. The Comment does not review the scientific data
concerning the dangers of radioactive wastes to the marine environment
and its potential impact on man, as that data is rudimentary at best and
subject to rapid change.
IV. THE REASONABLENESS PERSUASION AND ITS SUPPORT
This section focuses on two arguments supporting low-level radioac-
tive waste disposal at sea. The first concludes that dumping should be
permitted if nations can equitably and fairly distribute the costs and ben-
efits to all affected by the dumping.'5 3 The second argument urges the
adoption of an ocean dumping fee system which would require all gov-
ernments and private parties wishing to dump radioactive wastes at sea
to pay for the privilege, thereby creating a fund to compensate future
pollution victims. 5a Both ideas are premised explicitly or implicitly on a
150 See IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2. See also NEA OBJECTIVES,
supra note 2.
151 See, eg., UNSCEAR REPORT, supra note 148.
152 For instance, the IAEA recommendations were changed a mere three years after the LDC
came into force. IAEA Definitions and Recommendations, supra note 2. These recommendations
were changed again in 1986. See supra note 80. UNSCEAR has issued updated exposure level
reports six times in the last three decades, often revising and adding whole new concerns. UN-
SCEAR REPORT, supra note 148, at 5 n.2. Clearly, the dangers of radioactivity have not yet been
fully exposed or understood. Advancement of current knowlege of the dangers of radioactivity re-
quires more research and more time to digest new information.
153 Finn, supra note 10.
154 Lahey, Economic Changes for Environmental Protection: Ocean Dumping Fees, 11 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 305 (1984).
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theory that ocean disposal of low-level radioactive wastes is reasonable
compared to the relative safety of ocean disposal by other means.
Proponents of the first argument - which may be termed an equity
argument 55 - provide several reasons why the ocean disposal option
might be preferable to land-based methods. Such justification includes
the potential development of monitoring systems of ocean disposal loca-
tions,156 the geological stability of certain seabed sediments, 5 7 the
ocean's capacity to dilute wastes escaping from a disposal site,"5 8 the abil-
ity to isolate wastes from human intrusion, 15 9 and the political advantage
of not storing wastes near human habitation.' 60 Once the sea is chosen as
a radioactive waste repository, the equity argument proceeds on the basis
that states have an international obligation to cooperate in resolving the
scientific and legal issues, as well as "to ensure that such activities are
reasonable in the circumstances."
161
The equity argument recognizes that "international environmental
law is poorly equipped to deal with situations in which national actions
create a risk to the global commons or other transfrontier areas.' 62 As
discussed earlier, this condition exists largely because of the lack of sanc-
tions.163 In order to compensate, the equity argument relies on existing
international organizations such as the IAEA and the NEA to act as
centers for information, management, and operation of radioactive waste
disposal at sea. "Within these functions it is possible to implement a
common framework for policy making, adopt a common policy, promul-
155 Finn, supra note 10.
156 Id. at 640. Finn's acceptance of this point may be misplaced. He cites no scientific report of
such monitoring systems being more advanced than those available for land-based disposal. Indeed,
it is hard to conceive that monitoring of the oceans would be easier than monitoring wastes in stable
salt formations on land.
157 Id. at 640-41.
158 Id. at 641.
159 Id. This may in fact prove to be a negative reason for ocean dumping of radioactive wastes.
One method of minimizing the damage to the environment would be to remove the hazard. If that
cannot be accomplished, the hazard will be maximized. While land-based disposal may pose a
slightly greater security risk, it does not also limit access in case of emergency. For instance, if
monitors detect a leak of wastes into ground water, it will be easier to remove the hazard from the
problem area, minimizing the human and environmental impact.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 664. Just what is "reasonable" presents another problem. What is a reasonable course
of action for Great Britain may not be reasonable in light of long-range consequences for the people
and environment around the Irish Sea. This is fundamentally a problem of reasonableness, sug-
gesting a reason why the needs of future generations require direct representation in the decisional
process. See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
162 Finn, supra note 10, at 673.
163 See supra notes 124-47 and accompanying text.
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gate a single policy, or conduct joint operations."164 Such cooperation is
possible in part because of the responsibility of each sovereign to avoid
polluting the global commons.1 65 This responsibility comes from the
doctrine of reasonable use of the high seas found in traditional maritime
law and standards of international diplomacy and is intended "to insure
equitable international sharing of the resources of such domains through
special arrangements."
' 166
The equity argument recognizes that, even if ocean disposal of radi-
oactive wastes is conducted on a limited basis, the activity creates risks
which counterbalance any benefits derived from marine resources. 167
While the risks are shared by all in the global environment, the benefits
of the risks go only to a few of the highly developed nuclear nations and
their nuclear industries. 168 The equity argument requires that, if these
nations create the risks, they must remedy the imbalance in a variety of
ways.1 69 These remedies include sharing the technology with non-nu-
clear nations, establishing an international agency to manage nuclear fuel
cycle technology, and establishing an international corporation to pro-
vide fuel cycle services.
170
The options provided by the equity argument are unsatisfactory be-
cause each presents unique problems. Of foremost concern is the need to
prevent the stockpiling of materials generated by nuclear power plant
operations which could be used later to construct nuclear weapons by
nations or terrorist groups. Even if this problem could be remedied, the
equity argument encourages the international organization charged with
the waste task to be economically efficient, reduce environmental
hazards, and provide "equitable provision of disposal services" to devel-
oping nations.1 71 The proponents of the equity argument recognize that
developing such an organization would require the resolution of "many
delicate questions about the powers and structure of the organiza-
tion." 172 In addition, the equally sensitive and perplexing issues sur-
164 Finn, supra note 10, at 685.
165 Id. This idea is present in a much stronger formulation in Part IV of this Comment and in
Brown-Weiss, supra note 30.
166 Finn, supra note 10, at 687.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 687-88.
169 Id. at 688.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 689.
172 Id. This appears to be Finn's recognition of the problems with the equity argument. To some
extent, the same criticisms can be made of the planetary trust theory, but the planetary trust theory
offers the advantage of time to resolve these problems-by halting sea disposal of radioactive wastes.
Thus, there is less need to share the potentially dangerous technology. See infra notes 199-229 and
accompanying text.
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rounding the peaceful and lethal uses of nuclear technology must be
resolved. If these difficult issues are not resolved, the equity argument
cannot provide an answer to the radioactive waste disposal question.
The reason the equity argument creates certain problems is that it
ignores two themes in international law concerning radioactive waste dis-
posal at sea. First, the argument does not consider the interests of future
generations. Second, it does not reflect the true spirit of environmental
protection fostered by the Stockholm Conference, the LDC, UNCLOS
III, and other international agreements.1 73 Selecting one or two of these
themes at the expense of others betrays the intent expressed by interna-
tional lawmakers.
The ocean dumping fee alternative is beset by a different set of
problems.' 74 The premise to this argument is that pollution is an eco-
nomic market failure.175 The failure results in part from dealing with
pollution through regulation instead of fee charges. "Under the charge
system, those with low control costs will reduce their pollution more
than those with higher control costs. Thus the fee system's incentives
will induce dischargers to choose the least costly methods of reducing
overall pollutant discharge."
' 176
The proponents of this alternative argue that the fee system will lead
to the development of more socially desirable disposal technology. Un-
like a regulatory scheme, the fee system creates a constant incentive for
innovation because the fee is imposed even on small amounts of dis-
charge. 177 Nonetheless, the actual effect on innovation and development
of new technologies resulting from the fee system is not well
documented. 178
The fee system could operate in various ways, based on attainment
of an environmental standard, social cost, revenue generation, or a com-
bination of these methods. 179 The social cost approach imposes a charge
equalling the external costs created by the polluter. Thus, the fee "re-
173 See supra notes 35-123 and accompanying text.
174 Lahey, supra note 154.
175 Id. at 315. Note that Lahey's argument applies for ocean dumping of waste in general, not
radioactive wastes in particular. Lahey makes no distiction among different types of wastes, so one
may assume the argument applies to each type of waste as well.
176 Id. at 316.
177 Id. at 317. The claim is that the fee system will also discourage delaying tactics by the indus-
try since fee payment continues throughout the delay. The same idea, it is argued, will push industry
toward innovation so as to reduce the fee it pays. Id.
178 Id. at 318. The same can be said for understanding how the current scheme of regulation
works. Id. This uncertainty over a very basic idea behind the fee system leads to skepticism as to
the success of the whole alternative.
179 Id. at 317.
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flects the pure price of pollution. The government.., must therefore
determine the amount of harm caused by each marginal unit of dis-
charge. '1 80 The problems stemming from the fee system are obvious. It
is difficult to measure the amount of environmental damage caused by
any pollution and it is difficult to place a value on that damage.
181
A second suggested form of the charge system is what some econo-
mists call the ambient standards approach. Under this system, a desired
level of environmental quality is established, then a fee is fixed to bring
about that standard of quality.182 "This approach encourages the pol-
luter to reduce emissions to the level where the cost of reducing another
unit of pollution, the marginal treatment cost, is greater or equal to the
unit emission charge."1 83 In order to establish this figure, the agency
would need to collect data on the relative cost of abatement technologies
or other disposal methods.184 This procedure is used in several Soviet
bloc nations 85 where the level of cooperation between the fee setting au-
thority and the polluter is greater than that between private industries
and government agencies in Europe and the United States.
The final method for establishing a fee system is the revenue gener-
ating approach. Under this method, the level of the fee is based on how
much revenue it creates.1 86 The revenue generating approach may be
divided further into three subcategories depending upon the use of the
income: 1) compensating victims, 2) financing environmental protection
efforts, or 3) "reimbursing the government for special services rendered
to the polluter."' 187 The first subcategory has been used in Europe188 and
the United States.1 89 The Superfund for toxic waste cleanup is, perhaps,
the best example in the United States. Since 1973, Japan has used this
income as compensation for victims of sulfer dioxide air pollution. 190
The revenue creating scheme is used in a variety of other contexts, such
180 Id. Another problem is valuing future pollution, considering the long-term hazard of radioac-
tive wastes. The United States legal system has had some idea of the problems such time delays
cause in the tort cases concerning DES and asbestos. Those delays lasted just over a few decades.
Problems arising from radioactivity, as already noted, may be compounded over much longer peri-
ods of time.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 320.
183 Id. Again, attention to the future hazard is missing. The idea of preserving and improving
the environment is seemingly ignored here.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 321.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 321-22.
190 Id. at 322.
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as motor vehicle taxes, harbor fees, and federal aviation services. 19' It is
easy to imagine a fee system combining all three uses for the income
generated by the dumping fees.
Proponents suggest several justifications for the adoption of a fee
system for ocean dumping. They argue that a fee system "calculated in
light of alternative waste disposal costs" would reduce the actual amount
of waste disposed in the ocean by bringing ocean disposal into political
and economic parity with other disposal methods.192 This parity is nec-
essary because few constituencies represent the interests of the sea. 193 A
fee system would shift disposal decisions from the political to the envi-
ronmental arena.' 94 A variable fee which increases proportionally with
the increased hazard from the waste (i.e., from low-level to high-level
radioactive wastes), makes it less desirable to dump more dangerous
materials at sea.1 95 The same variable fee structure would be used to
determine the location of the dumpsites; the more appropriate the dump-
site, the lower the fee. 196 It is suggested that this fee system will reduce
the overall environmental impact on the sea.
197
A significant drawback to the fee system is its danger, given that
"our current knowledge of the marine environment is rudimentary and
incapable of accurately predicting the effects of ocean dumping."'' 9 8 In
essence, the fee system would permit ocean disposal of materials which
may or may not cause irreversible damage to the marine environment.
The fees generated might allow government and industry to conduct the
necessary studies to determine the effects and proper techniques for
ocean dumping. By the time those studies are completed, however, sig-
nificant damage may have already occurred.
There is a need to examine radioactive waste disposal at sea in a way
which reflects the lack of knowledge of both the sea and the effects of
radioactivity on that environment. This view should also consider the
long-term problems of radioactive waste disposal which will affect future
generations and which the other solutions fail to address. The solution
proposed in the Comment is that of a planetary trust. The argument
191 Id.
192 Id. at 324-25. This, like the incentives for innovation, is not documented. See supra note 178.
193 Lahey, supra note 154, at 324. Of course, this is one of the main problems the intergenera-
tional trust attempts to solve. Focusing attention on the long-term, not short-term, consequences of
radioactive dumping assures future generations some voice in policy decisions. See infra notes 225-
29 and accompanying text.
194 Lahey, supra note 154, at 325.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 326.




places proper emphasis on all four themes of international law concern-
ing radioactive waste disposal at sea. It is to this solution which this
Comment now turns.
V. THE PLANETARY TRUST AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
AT SEA
The planetary trust199 recognizes two fundamental ideas: 1) the
world's resources are both renewable and exhaustible, and 2) the assump-
tion developed in Western thought over several centuries that the future
will be better than the past."° The technologies created in recent times,
such as nuclear technology, have threatened this latter idea of perpetual
progress:
While the human species has always had the ability to harm its local envi-
ronment, sometimes in devastating ways, we never before had the capacity
to do so on a global scale, through so many means.
Our capacity to harm the environment globally forces us for the first
time to be concerned at a global level with the survival of the natural and
cultural heritage that we pass to future generations.20 1
Under the global trust, each generation has a fiduciary duty to fu-
ture generations to ensure that they will inherit a fair share of the global
heritage.20 2 A large part of that fiduciary duty is to maintain the global
resources and environment so that future generations may use and enjoy
the same benefits derived from the earth and have the same chance to
develop new resources.20 3 This view may extend to preserving other
forms of life whether they are viewed as existing solely for the benefit of
the human population or whether a fiduciary duty exists to other spe-
cies.2" The fiduciary duty is based on the desire of existing communities
to transcend current events and understand the role of future genera-
tions.20 5 This philosophy has been codified in current environmental leg-
islation and treaties, including the LDC, UNCLOS III, and the other
199 Brown-Weiss, supra note 30.
200 Id. at 495.
201 Id. at 497-98. Although the same argument could be made for the effects of the invention of
the cross-bow or the machine gun, never before have so few individuals, with so few arms, possessed
the means to cause global damage.
202 Id. at 498. This is not to say that the current generation must merely subsist with what it has,
but it must balance its own interests with those of future generations and other species. Id. at 48
n.13.
203 Id. at 499.
204 Id. at 498-99 nn.13-14. The idea that man has a responsibility to other species has been
expounded by many, including Laurence Tribe, a United States constitutional scholar, and St. Fran-
cis of Assisi, so by no means is this idea new to this generation. Id.
205 Id. at 501.
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international declarations and agreements discussed earlier.2 6 The prob-
lem of the global trust is balancing the desire to maximize current and
immediate future benefits with the prospects of leaving future generations
a despoiled environment.
The problem could be solved by creating a perpetual trust for future
generations through positive law. This trust would require the current
trustees - the generation now controlling the planet's future - to meet
a standard of behavior equal to that of any trustee: that of a prudent
person dealing with their own property.20 7 No speculative activity would
be permitted.20 8 The corpus of the trust would be the resources of the
earth; its basic purpose would be "to sustain the welfare of future genera-
tions. '20 9 This central purpose is broken down into three subdivisions: 1)
sustaining the life support systems of the planet, 2) sustaining the systems
necessary to the survival of the human species, and 3) sustaining a
healthy environment.210
There are a variety of ways to consider the interests of future gener-
ations with respect to natural resources. The preservation of resources
requires that each generation leave future generations resources in ap-
proximately the same condition.211 Another way to respect future inter-
ests is to prohibit waste.212 This idea is contained in a number of
environmental treaties relating to radioactive waste disposal at sea, in-
cluding the Stockholm Declaration and UNCLOS 111.213 Still other
forms of trust administration, such as economic efficiency, diversification
of risk, and preservation of the quality of the trust assets, might also be
considered.214
The duty of the planetary trustees is "to sustain the welfare of future
generations. ' 215  Of the methods just described to administer the trust,
206 Both treaties refer to the need to protect the sea environment in a way which would preserve it
for the future. See supra notes 49-123 and accompanying text.
207 Brown-Weiss, supra note 30, at 507.
208 Id. Brown-Weiss bases her idea of the trust on United States law, particularly the Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts (1959). While this is not essential, it does provide a well-developed basis for
constructing the details of the intergenerational trust administration.
209 Id. at 508.
210 Id. at 508-09.
211 Id. at 510.
212 Id. at 512-16. In the radioactive waste context, this would dictate a prohibition against pre-
ventable damage to the marine environment akin to a prohibition against waste in property law. The
typical classroom case of waste is when a trustee holding the land is prevented from cutting timber
except for use in building a house or heating it.
213 Id. at 512-13 nn.87 & 94. See supra notes 1, 61-66, & 121-23 and accompanying text.
214 Brown-Weiss, supra note 30, at 516-23.
215 Id. at 523.
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none should be used exclusively. There are four principles to guide the
selection of those trust administration ideas:
1. Equity among generations. The present generation would not have li-
cense to use resources to the exclusion of future generations or to burden
unreasonably the present generation in favor of future generations;
2. Flexible values among generations. The present generation is not re-
quired to predict the values of future generations;
3. Clarity in the administration of the trust. The trustees must administer
the trust with regard to forseeable situations; and
4. The principles should be shared by different cultural traditions. Since
the planetary trust is global, it should not favor one economic or political
system.
216
Radioactive waste disposal at sea would violate these principles un-
less the current generation could guarantee the safety of such disposal.
Ocean dumping would violate equity among generations if it damaged
the marine environment and its resources. This suggests that safety be of
paramount concern because, once resources are destroyed, future genera-
tions will not be able to take advantage of them. The harm to the marine
environment resulting from radioactive wastes would also violate the
flexibility principle as it decreases the options available for future genera-
tions in ordering their values. The foreseeability principle dictates that
the current generation refrain from damaging the marine environment by
dumping known hazards, including radioactive wastes. Finally, radioac-
tive waste disposal at sea violates the cultural equity principle by damag-
ing a shared resource. Dumping benefits only those nations with nuclear
capacities at the expense of developing nations. Other forms of radioac-
tive waste disposal do not share this inequity because they involve the use
of the land of the waste-producing nation and generally avoid harming
other nations.
In addition to these principles, two other requirements should guide
the administration of the trust: conservation of options and conservation
of quality.217 The conservation of options entails preserving biological
natural resources and cultural diversity.218 The former is particularly
important in terms of radioactive waste disposal at sea:
While no one would claim that all existing species are ecologically essential
to human culture, scientists do not yet know the critical threshold at which
the extermination of the species will seriously disrupt our ecosystem. We
do know, however, that it takes thousands of years for species to evolve and
that extinction is final.
2 19
216 Id. at 525.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 526-31.
219 Id. at 527.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:803(1986)
Radioactive wastes clearly have the potential to harm our ecosystems.
That we do not know the impact of these materials on ocean ecosystems
should lead to great restraint based upon principles of equity. The pres-
ent generation should not force future generations to bear the burden of
cleaning up inherited radioactive wastes because the future generations
cannot share the earlier benefits.22 °
Establishing a planetary trust conforms to the four themes of inter-
national law concerning radioactive waste disposal at sea. While it may
be difficult to implement internationally, the trust strives for interna-
tional cooperation and offers an equitable sharing of the burdens and
benefits. In addition, the trust recognizes the need to preserve and im-
prove the environment in order to fulfill the duty to future generations.
Admittedly, establishing the trust as positive law is not probable today.
Nonetheless, it is possible to create the same effect by implementing the
fiduciary duty as part of customary international law. This would elimi-
nate the pressure to make the trust part of positive law, as customary
obligations extend to each nation.221 The prohibitions against genocide
and slavery are other examples of such international customary
obligations.222
While not specifically mentioning the planetary trust, treaties and
other international agreements aimed at protecting the environment rep-
resent progress towards this ideal.223 The LDC's prohibition on dump-
ing high-level radioactive wastes at sea recognizes, at least implicitly, the
need to protect the environment for future generations. Nonetheless, the
LDC and other agreements are only rudimentary first steps as national
and international organizations are equipped to handle only those
problems lasting a few years, not generations.224
There are four possible strategies which may be used to combat the
inherent defects of existing institutions: 1) the representation of future
generations in decision making, 2) the development of a global informa-
tion network, 3) the promotion of scientific research, and 4) the establish-
ment of a trust fund for future generations.225 Each strategy, except the
trust fund, could be implemented on a national, regional, or global level.
In fact, the LDC and UNCLOS III already provide for the development
220 Id. at 534. There is, of course, debate as to whether ocean disposal or land-based disposal
presents the better alternative waste system if the need arises to remove the radioactive wastes to
another location. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
221 Id. at 540-41.
222 Id. at 541.
223 See supra notes 36-123 and accompanying text.
224 Brown-Weiss, supra note 30, at 563.
225 Id. at 563-64.
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of global information networks and the promotion of scientific research.
The more difficult strategies to implement, particularly on a global scale,
will be the representation of future generations in decision making.22 6 It
is not sufficient that future interests are recognized in United Nations
resolutions and treaties.227 Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that either
the actual representation of future generations or the trust fund will be-
come a reality.
The representation of future generations in the decisional process is
not as foreign as it may appear. The concept parallels the representation
by lawmakers of the interests of those too young to vote; it approaches an
idea of virtual representation. One way of maintaining the idea of virtual
representation of future generations is to postpone certain decisions, such
as whether to dispose of radioactive wastes at sea. This delay would give
future generations the time to develop technologies to protect themselves,
their environment, and their descendants. By postponing the technologi-
cal decisions which we are currently unable to make, we also avoid sub-
jecting future generations to today's mistakes.
This discussion provides just a brief sketch of intergenerational rep-
resentation. While the idea needs to be developed further, it could be
useful in resolving problems posed by radioactive waste disposal at sea.
The failure of the international community to provide for future genera-
tions is the most compelling reason to halt present sea dumping. The
failure to provide future generations adequate representation in the
decision-making process is apparent by the lack of sanctions in any of the
international agreements regulating ocean dumping. 8 If members of
the current generation have no recourse for injury from radioactive
wastes dumped at sea, then this lack of sanction inevitably will translate
into a lack of cleanup funds in the future.
Society does possess the structural framework for developing a
global information network and promoting scientific research. Organiza-
tions such as the OECD and the IAEA can be employed. They should
be used to gather and distribute research funds to examine the feasibility
of the oceans as sites for radioactive waste in comparison with other dis-
posal methods. The private sector should be given incentives to assist in
this research. In fact, it would be best if the industry which creates much
of the radioactive waste were required or strongly encouraged to partici-
pate in this research.
226 Id. at 564.
227 See supra notes 36-123 and accompanying text.
228 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Until the protection of current and future generations can be as-
sured, dumping radioactive waste at sea should cease. Other disposal
methods, particularly some forms of land containment, have several
short-term advantages and should be explored. One advantage to this
approach is that it is much easier to contain radioactive wastes than it is
to dive thousands of meters into the sea to recover the wastes.229 An-
other advantage is that it avoids the current lack of ocean disposal moni-
toring. Since the current generation has created the problem of
radioactive waste disposal at sea, it is incumbent upon this generation
both to contain and solve the problem. This generation can start first by
recognizing the themes repeatedly expressed by international lawmakers
over the past thirty years. The interests of future generations must be
fully considered and assured. Future generations deserve to inherit a
healthy, robust environment. Cooperation based on a system of interna-
tional equity is essential if the present generation intends to meet the
goals established by international law.
David G. Spak
229 It is interesting to note that the LDC finally voted to establish a panel to examine the wider
political, social, economic, and legal questions of radioactive waste disposal at sea. Included in this
examination will be a comparison of other disposal methods. Resolution LDC 28(10), Studies and
Assessments Pursuant to Resolution LDC 21(9), IMO Doc. LDC X/15 (Nov. 5, 1986).
